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The Bangkok Post's military reporter Wassana in the Bangkok Post on the rise of Gen. Prayuth, who became new army chief on October 1:
Newly appointed army chief Prayuth Chan-ocha is planning trips to the North and the Northeast to visit relatives of red shirt protesters who were killed in the April-May rallies.
Well known for his opposition to the red shirts, Gen Prayuth's surprise plan forms part of his policy to patch up differences with United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship supporters.
The visits are intended as a gesture to reach out to members of the red shirt movement and to project a new image for Gen Prayuth, who has been viewed as taking a hard-line stance against the group, sources close to him said.
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The army, which laid low for years after the disgrace of Black May in 1992, re-entered the political arena when it staged the coup on Sept 19, 2006, that toppled the Thaksin Shinawatra government.
Gen Prayuth was then a deputy commander of the 1st Army. He led his troops in supporting the putsch alongside Gen Anupong.
He has stood side by side with Gen Anupong from the beginning of their military careers, during negotiations inside a military camp that led to the formation of the Democrat-led coalition government, the crackdown on red shirt protesters in April last year and the operation to reclaim Ratchaprasong in April and May this year.
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Gen Prayuth is known for his combative approach, for being decisive and for his fierce opposition to the Thaksin regime and the red shirt movement.
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Gen Prayuth has solid back-up _ his former classmates from Class 12 of the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School control key army units. They are also considered hawkish. They include Gen Dapong Ratanasuwan, the army chief-of-staff who played an important role in plotting the crackdown on the red shirts.
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| จาก bangkokpost |
BP: So as we see the army chief has been closely involved in the rise of the army since 2006. However, he is now trying to offer an olive branch to the red shirts, but also red shirt soldiers as Wassna referred to in a later column in the Bangkok Post:
According to the plan, Gen Prayuth will not only seek to reconcile with the red shirts but also with the so-called "watermelon" soldiers who are clad in green military uniform but in their hearts root for the red shirts.
It is estimated there are about 400 generals - from the rank of major-general up - who have been "pickled" in the army's vast vat of inactive positions because they are believed to have red links or leanings.
On his first day in office, Gen Prayuth sent a message to those who may be feeling disenfranchised: "I would like to ask all of you to love the army. Do not seek to destroy the army even if you have failed to secure a promotion. You may feel disappointed but I assure you I will see to it that you receive justice."
Gen Prayuth plans to assign responsibilities to these inactive generals so that they may redeem their self-esteem. He has assigned Gen Wit Dhephasdin Na Ayutthaya, chairman of the army's advisory board, to take care of them and to distribute some meaningful assignments to them, too.
It remains to be seen how long Gen Prayuth, the ultimate hawk, will last in this guise of a reconciliatory dove.
This reconciliation did not last long as the Bangkok Post reported on October 19:
New army chief Prayuth Chan-ocha has wasted no time in wielding his power by ordering a reshuffle of 229 senior officers.
The rejig has led to the transfer of regimental commanders reportedly linked with the red shirt movement.
Among them is Col Natthawat Akanibut, son of Gen Pat Akkanibut, who is a close friend of Puea Thai Party chairman Chavalit Yongchaiyudh.
He has been removed as commander of the 1st Infantry Regiment (King's Guards) and becomes deputy commander of Kanchanaburi Military District.
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"Gen Prayuth is still concerned about soldiers who are close to the red shirts," the source said.
Before this, Thitinan had an op-ed in the Bangkok Post on the rise of Prayuth and the dominance of the Eastern Tigers of the Queen's Guard (where Anupong and Prayuth previously served) and Prayuth's classmates from the Armed Forces Military Preparatory School, Class 12. Key excerpts:
His [Prayuth's] unprecedented promotion bears far-reaching implications and reveals the behind-the-scenes manoeuvring in Thai politics. The source of Gen Prayuth's fast-track rise is the location and character of his unit, namely the 21st Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Infantry Division based in Prachin Buri, on the Thai-Cambodian border in the Lower Northeast region.
This division, broadly referred to as the "Eastern Tigers" comprises the 2nd, 12th and 21st regiments, the latter also famously known in military parlance as the Queen's Guard.
While the Eastern Tigers are now ascendant and assertive in the army's nexus of command positions, the Queen's Guard regiment is its vortex. Gen Prayuth is a through-and-through embodiment and personification of this regiment, whose select officers have undergone specialised training that includes classroom academic curriculum over the past two decades. They now dominate the army and, in turn, Thai politics.
Not since two decades ago has the army's command structure been so dominated by a fast-track cohort of this sort. More often than not, the army's commander-in-chief hailed from the 1st Infantry Division. Typically, the army's high command in the past was spread out among different units and class lines, rarely concentrated under one.
[Thitinan talks about previous times over the last 5-6 decades where a single group/class of military officers dominated the top military brass]
Gen Prayuth's ascendancy has changed all that. He now presides over a high command unusually filled by either former 21st Regiment standouts or his classmates from the Armed Forces Military Preparatory School, Class 12.
When such a concentrated command structure took place in the past, as with Class Seven and Class Five or the Ratchakru clan and Si Sao Theves group, it invariably led to political trouble. Army commanders felt emboldened to assert politically. Politicians and their routine corruption and cronyism were marginalised while the military's own graft and nepotism became salient.
Moreover, concentrated power sources in the military also led to attempted or successful coups by rival cohorts and disgruntled officers.
It is still early days for Gen Prayuth, but past experience with so much military power in the body politic does not bode well. The past has shown that powerful military cohorts do not return to the barracks voluntarily. A catharsis of crisis and clash between the military and civilians was always required, while challenges from within the military were not uncommon. That Gen Prayuth has stacked the high command with his regimental and Prep School Class 12 cohorts does not bode well.
On the dominance of a military clique, also see this article in The Nation by Avudh back in June, before the appointment of Prayuth:
The "Eastern Tigers" proved the right medicine for post-coup discontent. But they also blocked the career path of a large number of professional soldiers not in the same clique.
Should the "Eastern Tigers" get their way on succession plans, a military dynasty may emerge because an incumbent leader could pass his torch to a long line of designated successors.
While the bombs in December 2006 may have sounded an alarm about post-coup discontent, the "men in black" involved in the recent unrest in Bangkok served as a reminder of possible side-effects of the dominating influence of the "Eastern Tigers".
Out of spite or undying loyalty to Thaksin, some top generals may have helped prepare for the urban guerrilla clash as carried out by the men in black on April 10 and later days. But their common motive to get involved in plotting the unrest was probably the rise of the "Eastern Tigers".
It should not have gone unnoticed that Prayuth was the commander in charge during the April 10 violence, in which Colonel Romklao Thuwatham of the Second Infantry Division was killed. Romklao was from the "Eastern Tigers" clique.
None of the field commanders from Kanchanaburi, Bangkok and Lop Buri were harmed or targeted when they led security operations to end the Rajprasong rally on May 19.
In lining up the top brass in the coming annual reshuffle, Anupong is obligated to dispel any doubts about domination by the "Eastern Tigers". Prayuth, certainly well-qualified for promotion, might not be the most suitable candidate to lead the Army at this delicate juncture if reconciliation really is the top goal.
BP: One quick thing, Avudh has got the timeline incorrect. He refers to Anupong taking over as Army C-in-C in October 2006 (not excerpted above, but it is in the article) and then the bombs in December 2006 where he states that "[t]he bomb attacks in Bangkok on New Year's eve in 2006 remain unsolved but military leaders tacitly conceded there was discontent within the rank and file". The problem with this is that Anupong didn't become Army C-in-C until October 2007, but Avudh could certainly be right that it was discontent in the rank and file - see this article by Crispin and some additional background on the bombings in this post.
Well as we know now that the military didn't listen to Avudh and the top military brass is dominated by his classmates from the Armed Forces Military Preparatory School, Class 12 and by those who have served in the 21st Infantry Regiment.
Finally, on Prayuth and the direction he is setting for the army, Paul Quaglia in the WSJ states that Prayuth has been more politically active than his predecessor Anupong and then concludes:
That may be the kind of leadership that General Prayuth aims to provide, although his personal political views are unclear. He has not discussed elections or the government's plans for political "reconciliation" with disaffected pro-democracy supporters. But if Thai history teaches one thing, it's that Thais should be wary of anyone who promises to restore order. Democratic reform, governance transparency and public accountability could be the casualties.
BP: How hard line will Prayuth be? Despite some reconciliatory rhetoric, his past actions are unlikely to mean there will be any likely reconciliation. If he continues to shut out other military officers outside his cliques then well things could likely come to a head with those officers getting further frustrated...
Finally, Nirmal Ghosh in the Straits Times. Key excerpts:
General Prayuth Chan-ocha's takeover as Thailand's army chief tomorrow is seen as fortifying the establishment against a challenge to the traditional power structure at a critical time of transition.
The hawkish 56-year-old general is believed to be close to Queen Sirikit, as well as an old friend of the new, hand-picked chief of police.
When the army surrounded 'red shirt' protesters in Bangkok in May, it was he who wanted to move in and clear the demonstrators, reports said. But he had to defer to then-army chief General Anupong Paochinda who favoured a more cautious approach.
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Gen Prayuth's hardline stance is useful for an establishment believing it is under siege from the red movement largely loyal to former premier Thaksin Shinawatra.
An anti-monarchy vein demanding that the palace stay out of politics, and determined to erode the power of the old-money elites, also threatens the status quo.
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